Abstract-In the Trigger and Data AcQuisition (TDAQ) system for the ATLAS project authorization of users will be an important task. The main goal of the authorization will be to reduce the chance of potentially dangerous actions being made by mistake. An Access Management (AM) component is being developed within the TDAQ to handle these issues. This paper presents the design and implementation of the component. It also describes the authorization model used and how authorization data is stored and administrated for the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Trigger and Data AcQuisition (TDAQ) system for the ATLAS will be a large distributed system consisting of several thousand nodes. Work on an access management component to handle authorization of users in the system started the summer 2004. The TDAQ system is described in detail in [1] .
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In many of the previous experiments at CERN access management has not been a priority. However, the scale of the ATLAS system and the large number of users demands the use of access management. The possibility of harmful actions being performed by a user is significant and cannot be overlooked. This can happen due to mistakes on part of the user or simply lack of information. Without any access control or a log of actions performed it can become very difficult to stop dangerous actions being made and very time consuming to fix the errors that might occur due to these.
To address these problems an Access Manager (AM) component has been developed for the TDAQ system. The component is responsible for authorizing users based on their rights in the system and to stop or allow actions based on the result of this authorization. The AM will also provide a log of all authorization and report repeated failed attempts to perform actions. Although the existence of the component will give some protection from deliberate attacks, this has not been a priority during the development of the component and such attacks should be handled at a wider scope than that of the AM component.
III. ACCESS CONTROL MODEL

A. Introduction
The users in the TDAQ system will have a defined job description (such as shifter, sub-detector expert, etc) and a set of 
B. Role Based Access Control
The following entities are used in explanation of the model: -A user is considered any entity performing an action within the system (i.e., normally a human user issuing commands). -A role typically represents a job function within the system (e.g., a shifter) with some associated permissions. -A permission denotes the right to perform a specific action within the system (e.g., shutdown server, start data taking, subscribe to information, etc). Under the RBAC framework, users are granted membership into roles based on their tasks and responsibilities in the organization. The different roles are assigned a set of permissions that includes and, is limited to, the actions needed for to perform the role. Access control is then performed based on the permissions of the role rather than of the user directly. This model allows for a central and fast administration of a large number of users.
A detailed description of the RBAC model is available in [2] .
IV. SCOPE OF THE ACCESS MANAGER
The component is currently limited to performing authorization only, and does not handle authentication or login of any kind. It is assumed that all users in the system have been successfully authenticated at the time authorization is performed by the AM.
The AM is limited to performing authorizations while the TDAQ system is running. No access control is provided for applications that run independently of the TDAQ, nor on binaries, access to files, etc. However, the database currently used by the AM is envisioned to also be used for these tasks in the future.
The TDAQ Inter Process Communication (IPC) package is based on the client-server architecture and utilizes the CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) [3] framework. CORBA is used in the TDAQ system due to the scale (several thousand nodes) and the distributed nature of the system. The CORBA architecture therefore provides a basis for the design of the AM.
V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Overview
This section describes some of the design choices and implementation of the AM component. Logically the AM component is divided into three main parts: 1) A client part based on the CORBA interceptors. This part is responsible for requesting authorization and stopping calls that are not allowed. 2) The AM server is responsible for performing the authorization based on the permissions of the user. To be able to perform the authorizations, the server communicates with a database containing all necessary information on users, roles and permissions.
3) The database of users, rights, groups, etc and the administrative tools to modify this database.
B. Client Part
The client part of the AM package is based on the interceptor functionality specified in the CORBA standard [3] . The standard allows for the implementation of, among others, request-level interceptors. These are functions that will be called at predefined points in the CORBA call chain as shown in Fig. 1 .
The interceptor implemented by the AM will be called whenever a request is made by a client and before it is sent through the Object Request Broker (ORB) to the server. The interceptor retrieves the necessary information needed to authorize the user and then sends a request for authorization of the action to the AM server. If the user is not authorized the request is stopped. Otherwise it proceeds as normal to the server.
The interceptor runs on the client side, and will therefore help spread the load of performing authorization as the number of clients is significantly higher than the number of servers. It will also reduce the amount of data being sent over the network.
The interceptor is implemented in both C++ and in Java as the system uses both a C++ ORB and a JAVA ORB. It is loaded at run time using a run-time library in C++ and using JAVA Reflection for the JAVA part.
1) Cache:
The interceptor implements a cache mechanism to store results returned from the AM server. The results are time stamped when they are put in the cache and are only valid for a predefined time. This timeout provides a way of ensuring that any changes to permissions in the AM server are propagated throughout the system. Before an authorization request is sent to the AM server the cache is checked for any valid results for the same request. If a result is found the timestamp is compared to the current system time. If the result is valid no request is sent to the AM server and the result from cache is used instead. Otherwise, if the result is too old it will be removed from the cache. In this case a request is sent to the AM server as normal. Fig. 2 shows the flow in the system at client side.
The cache mechanism has been implemented to reduce the amount of requests being sent to the AM server. By doing this on the clients, performance of the system can be significantly increased, especially for large configurations. The timeout of results in the cache can be modified to create an appropriate trade-off between performance and the time it takes for changes in the authorization data to propagate throughout the system. Due to the high number of authorizations this timeout can be set to a low value (less than 30 seconds) while still providing a significant increase in performance.
C. The AM Server
The AM server is responsible for authorizing a user for a given action. The AM server has access to the database describing all users, roles and permissions within the system. Requests for authorization are received from the AM interceptor and the server then checks the database and returns the result to the AM interceptor. Fig 3 shows the interaction of the different components in the system.
To help ensure a satisfactory performance, the AM server loads all data for users, roles and permissions into memory at start-up. Hash tables are created to minimize the amount of time used for lookups in the data. The AM server will keep a record of all authorizations and can be directly controlled by an administrator. Typically commands from the administrator include reloading of database into memory, user administration and modifying permissions of roles. The AM server is implemented as a CORBA server and is written in C++ to maximize performance.
D. Database and Administration
This part consists of the database used to store information about the users and their rights, and also a collection of tools used to modify the database.
For administrating the users, roles and permissions in the system is a graphical user interface has been developed. The tool allows an administrator to do all necessary modifications on the database itself such as add/remove users, modify rights of users/groups and also can send commands to the AM server if it is running. The GUI has been developed using C++ and the Qt ® library. The database is currently being stored as a relational database using the MySQL DBMS.
VI. AUTHORIZATION QUALIFIERS
The interface to all the servers in the system is defined in OMG Interface Definition Language (IDL). Details on IDL are available in [3] . The interface to each server is defined in an IDL file and the same structure is used for all the servers in the system. Any possible requests from a client to a server are defined in the IDL and we have therefore chosen to perform the authorization based on information obtained from these files. When a request is sent the interceptor retrieves the user name (user owning the running process), module and interface name of the object being called and the name of the method being called.
This information is available as a part of the CORBA framework and can therefore be retrieved in the interceptors without the client or server providing any information. It is however not possible to retrieve the parameters of the method being called. To be able to perform authorization based on the parameter it would be necessary for the servers to call the AM server directly after receiving the request from the client. While this certainly is feasible it would require major changes in the servers and, as mentioned, one of the primary goals was to introduce the AM Fig. 2 . This diagram shows the flow in the system on the client side from when a client sends a request until authorization is finished. Fig. 3 . This shows the AM interceptor and AM server in relation to the rest of the system. The number indicates which order the different actions are performed. component while requiring the least possible changes for the existing system. It will for some servers in the system be necessary to perform authorizations of this kind and the functionality will be extended to support this during the summer 2005.
VII. PERFORMANCE
Performance tests of the AM were done on a large scale during the summer 2005. Fig. 4 shows the time needed for a complete cycle of the TDAQ system (from setup, through all states to shutdown) both with and without the AM for different configurations. The extra time required while using the AM remained more or less constant (about 30%). This can probably be reduced with some optimization in the AM. It is also worth noting that the tests are more intensive on the AM than a normal run as cycling through the states involves a high number of authorizations compared to leaving the system in a state for a longer period.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we have presented the design and implementation of the access management component for the TDAQ system of ATLAS. We have managed to build a flexible access control system while keeping the performance and administration overhead to a minimum. The use of CORBA interceptors has made it possible to implement the AM transparently for both the clients and servers in the system, and thus minimal changes to the existing system have been necessary. The RBAC model has proved to be a good choice for the TDAQ system as it lets us properly represent the working structure while keeping the system flexible and adaptable.
Functionality of the AM will be extended during the summer 2005 to support direct communication with some of the servers. This will provide a more flexible authorization at the cost of more complexity in the permissions database. It is however necessary to provide the level of detail needed in the authorization.
The scope of the AM is currently limited to the CORBA part of the system. Plans to extend the functionality and widen the scope have been made, and work on this will start up mid 2005. The plan is to continue using the RBAC model and keep a centrally managed database of users, roles and permissions for the entire system.
